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Abstract
In this article, we have proposed a public key cryptography using Affine-Hill
cipher with generalised Fibonacci matrix(called multinacci matrix). Also proposed
a key establishment(exchange of key matrixK = Qkλ of order λ×λ for encryption-
decryption) scheme with the help of multinacci sequences under prime modulo. In
this scheme, instead of exchanging key matrix, we need to exchange only pair of
numbers (λ, k), which reduces the time complexity as well as space complexity and
comes with a large key-space.
Keywords: Affine Hill Cipher, Cryptography, Fibonacci Sequence & Matrix, Multinacci
Sequence & Matrix,
Mathematics Subject Classifications: 11T71, 11B39, 14G50, 68P30, 68R01, 94A60
1 Introduction
In classical cryptography, Hill cipher [10, 12, 13] is one of the polygraphic substitution
ciphers which is based on residue system and linear algebra which was developed by the
mathematician Lester Hill in 1929.
M.K. Viswanath, et.al [17] proposed the concept of public key cryptography using
Hill’s Cipher. They developed public key cryptography with Hills cipher system us-
ing rectangular matrix and for inverse of key matrix, they used MoorePenrose Inverse
∗E-mail: klkaprsd@gmail.com, ORCiD ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3653-5854/
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(Pseudo Inverse) method. Later, P. Sundarayya & G.V. Prasad [15] worked on same pa-
per [17], and they proposed the method which increase the security of the above system
by involving two or more digital signatures. To increase security of Hill Cipher, Thilaka
and Rajalakshmi [16] extended the concept of Hill Cipher by enciphering of m-length
string to n-length string(n ≥ m) using affine transformation and polynomial transfor-
mation. While In [6], Indivar Gupta, et.al shows that these extension of Hill Cipher are
prone to cryptanalytic attack and suggested that modifications in Hill Cipher do not make
it significantly stronger.
In this paper, we develop a public key cryptosystem using Affine-Hill Cipher with
generalised Fibonacci(multinacci) matrix with large power k, i.e Qkλ as key. Our method
is quite robust and can be implemented easily.
This paper is organized as follow. Following the introduction, the basic concept of Hill’s
Cipher & Affine Cipher is outlined in Section 2. In Section 3, we discuss about Fibonacci
&Multinacci sequences and development of matrix corresponding to these sequences. In
Section 4, discussion of proposed method for generating key matrix and inverse of key
matrix with an numerical example. Finally in Section 5, we presented crypt-analytic
strength and concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
Hill’s Cipher
Hill cipher is the first polygraphic cipher1. The Hill’s encryption scheme takes n succes-
sive plaintext letters and substitutes them for n ciphertext letters. Here, we use matrix
representation P for plaintext, K for key matrix and C for ciphertext(encrypted matrix),
where P, K, and Q are given as
P =
[
P1 P2 ... Pm
]
, K =


K11 K12 ... K1n
K21 K22 ... K2n
...
...
. . .
...
Kn1 Kn2 ... Knn

 and C =
[
C1 C2 ... Cm
]
(2.1)
where P ′is and C
′
is are block matrix of size 1× n. Thus, Hill cipher is described as:
For encryption
Enc(P ): Ci ≡ PiK (mod p)
1Polygraphic cipher: In encryption, more than one letter can be encrypted at a time.
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For decryption
Dec(C) : Pi ≡ K−1Ci (mod p).
where p is prime and gcd(det(K), p) = 1.
Affine Cipher
One of the special case of substitution cipher is Affine Cipher [13], which is described
as
Enc(x) : y = (ax+ b) (mod 26),where a, b ∈ Z26 (2.2)
These functions are called affine functions and in the affine cipher, we restrict the en-
cryption function to affine function.
For decryption, we have to solve the above function for x, i.e
y ≡ (ax+ b) (mod 26)
i.e x ≡ a−1(y − b) (mod 26),where a, b, x, y ∈ Z26 (2.3)
where gcd(a, 26) = 1, which confirms the existence of a−1.
Affine-Hill Cipher
Affine-Hill Cipher is polygraphic block cipher, which extends the concept of the Hill
Cipher as described above. Affine-Hill Cipher’s encryption-decryption technique is given
as:
Enc(P ) : Ci ≡ (PiK +B) (mod p) (2.4)
Dec(C) : Pi ≡ (Ci − B)K−1 (mod p) (2.5)
Where Pi, Ci and B are 1 × n matrices, K is n × n key matrix, p is prime greater
than number of different characters used in plaintext and Enc(P ) & Dec(C) represents
encryption techniques and decryption techniques respectively.
2.1 Key exchange Algorithm(ElGamal Technique)
In 1984, T. Elgamal [11–13] proposed a public-key scheme based on discrete loga-
rithms [2] closely related to Deffie-Hellman technique. In Elgamal technique, the global
elements are the chosen prime p and selected primitive root of p.
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Let p be a prime. Now chose a private key D such that 1 < D < φ(p), then further
select a primitive root2 of p, say α. Further assign E1 = α and E2 = E
D
1 (mod p), then
make (p, E1, E2) as public key and keep D as secret key. Suppose entity Alice and Bob
want to exchange key.
2.1.1 Key exchanging
Using above public key(p, E1, E2), Alice generates k as
(i). Choose a random integer e such that 1 < e < φ(p), then
(ii). Compute signature k = Ee1 (mod p)
(iii). Compute secret key λ = Ee2 (mod p)
(iv). Thus, Alice who have access to Bob’s public key can encrypt message with their
secret key λ and send (k, C).
Key Recover by Bob:
After receiving (k, C) from Alice, Bob recovers secret key λ using their secret keyD as:
λ = cD (mod p)
≡ (Ee1)D (mod p)
≡ (ED1 )e (mod p)
≡ (E2)e (mod p) (2.6)
Thus, here Bob received the secret key λ securely and using this secret key λ, Bob will
decrypt the ciphertext C, and get original plaintext P .
3 Fibonacci Sequence and Fibonacci Qλ Matrix
The Fibonacci sequence [5,8,18] is the sequence of integers fn, defined by the recurrence
relation
fk+2 = fk + fk+1, k ≥ 0, with initial values f0 = 0, f1 = 1 (3.1)
Fibonacci-Qλ matrix was introduced by Brenner [5], later King were enumerated it’s
basic properties. In 1985, Honsberger [7] showed that the Fibonacci Q-matrix is a square
matrix of order 2 of the form Q2 =
[
f2 f1
f1 f0
]
=
[
1 1
1 0
]
.
2The exponent of α modulo p is the least positive integer k such that αk ≡ 1 (mod p). If the exponent
of α modulo p is φ(p) then α is said to be a primitive root of p.
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And, it can be observed that Qn2 =
[
fn+1 fn
fn fn−1
]
with Q2 =
[
1 1
1 0
]
. where, Fibonacci
Q2-matrix [3] has been developed using Fibonacci sequence and, it’s inverse is given by
(Qn2 )
−1 = (Q2)
−n =
[
f−n+1 f−n
f−n f−n−1
]
(3.2)
Where f−n represent negative Fibonacci numbers. As we know that, Fibonacci sequence
can be extended in negative which is given by f−n = (−1)n+1fn, n = 1, 2, 3, ..
And the determinant of Qn2 matrix is given by
det(Qn2 ) = fn+1fn−1 − f 2n (3.3)
Cassini’s Identity: Cassini’s Identity [9] is mathematical identity for the Fibonacci num-
bers. It was discovered in 1680 by J.D. Cassini by observing the pattern of Fibonacci
sequence. Cassini’s Identity states that for the nth-Fibonacci number
fn−1fn+1 − f 2n = (−1)n, where n ∈ Z
Thus, det(Qn2 ) = (−1)n (3.4)
=⇒ Qn2 is non-singular matrix, for all n.
In continuation to above Fibonacci matrix, Tribonacci matrix(for λ = 3), Qn3 is defined
as
Qn3 =


fn+2 fn+1 + fn fn+1
fn+1 fn + fn−1 fn
fn fn−1 + fn−2 fn−1

 with Q3 =


1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 0

 (3.5)
And inverse of Qn3 is given by
Q−n3 =


f−n+2 f−n+1 + f−n f−n
f−n+1 f−n + f−n−1 f−n−1
f−n f−n−1 + f−n−2 f−n−2

 with Q−13 =


0 1 0
0 0 1
1 −1 −1

 (3.6)
where tribonacci sequences is given by recurrence relation fk+3 = fk + fk+1 + fk+2,
k ∈ Z with initial values f0 = f1 = 0 & f2 = 1.
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3.1 Generalized Fibonacci Sequence and Fibonacci matrix
The λth order generalized Fibonacci sequence is given by the following λth order recur-
rence relation:
fk+λ = fk + fk+1 + ... + fk+λ−1 k ≥ 0, λ ∈ Z+ (3.7)
with initial values f0 = f1 = f2 = .... = fλ−2 = 0, fλ−1 = 1.
Consider the corresponding multinacci Qλ-matrix of order λ, given by
Qλ =


1 1 ... 1 1
1 0 ... 0 0
0 1 ... 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 ... 1 0


λ×λ
=


fλ fλ−1 + ...+ f0 fλ−1 + ...+ f1 ... fλ−1
fλ−1 fλ−2 + ... + f−1 fλ−2 + ...+ f0 ... fλ−2
...
...
...
. . .
...
f2 f1 + ... + f−λ f1 + ...+ f1−λ ... f1
f1 f0 + ...+ f−λ−1 f0 + ... + f−λ ... f0


And using mathematical induction, it can be observed that


1 1 1 ... 1 1
1 0 0 ... 0 0
0 1 0 ... 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ... 1 0


k
=


fk+λ−1 fk+λ−2 + ...+ fk−1 fk+λ−2 + ... + fk ... fk+λ−2
fk+λ−2 fk+λ−3 + ...+ fk−2 fk+λ−3 + ... + fk−1 ... fk+λ−3
...
...
...
. . .
...
fk+1 fk + ...+ fk−λ−1 fk + ... + fk−λ ... fk
fk fk−1 + ...+ fk−λ−2 fk−1 + ... + fk−λ−1 ... fk−1


= Qkλ (3.8)
Remark 1. Let Qkλ is generalized Fibonacci matrix of order λ× λ, then
det(Qλ) = (−1)λ−1 (here Qλ = Q1λ)
Thus, det(Qkλ) = [(−1)λ−1]k
= (−1)(λ−1)k (3.9)
We also observed that Qkλ.Q
1
λ = Q
k+1
λ As
Qkλ.Q
1
λ =

fk+λ−1 fk+λ−2 + fk+λ−3 + ...+ fk−1 fk+λ−2 + ... + fk ... fk+λ−2
fk+λ−2 fk+λ−3 + fk+λ−4 + ...+ fk−2 fk+λ−3 + ... + fk−1 ... fk+λ−3
...
...
...
. . .
...
fk+1 fk + fk−1 + ... + fk−λ−1 fk + ... + fk−λ ... fk
fk fk−1 + fk−2 + ...+ fk−λ−2 fk−1 + ... + fk−λ−1 ... fk−1


.


1 1 1 ... 1 1
1 0 0 ... 0 0
0 1 0 ... 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ... 1 0


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=

fk+λ−1 + fk+λ−2 + ...+ fk−1 fk+λ−1 + fk+λ−2 + ... + fk fk+λ−1 + ...+ fk+1 ... fk+λ−1
fk+λ−2 + fk+λ−3 + ...+ fk−2 fk+λ−2 + fk+λ−3 + ... + fk−1 fk+λ−2 + ...+ fk ... fk+λ−2
...
...
...
. . .
...
fk+1 + fk + ... + fk−λ−1 fk+1 + fk + ... + fk−λ fk+1 + ...+ fk−λ+1 ... fk+1
fk + fk−1 + ... + fk−λ−2 fk + fk−1 + ... + fk−λ−1 fk + ...+ fk−λ ... fk


entries of first column can be reduces using recurrence relations(3.7), which gives
=


fk+λ fk+λ−1 + fk+λ−2 + ...+ fk fk+λ−1 + ... + fk+1 ... fk+λ−1
fk+λ−1 fk+λ−2 + fk+λ−3 + ...+ fk−1 fk+λ−2 + ... + fk ... fk+λ−2
...
...
...
. . .
...
fk+2 fk+1 + fk + ...+ fk−λ fk+1 + ... + fk−λ+1 ... fk+1
fk+1 fk + fk−1 + ... + fk−λ−1 fk + ... + fk−λ ... fk


= Qk+1λ
Further, the recurrence relation (3.7) can be re-write as
fk = fk+λ − (fk+1 + ... + fk+λ−1) for k ≤ −1 (3.10)
Or, equivalently
f−k = f−k+λ − (f−k+1 + ... + f−k+λ−1) for k ≥ 1 (3.11)
with the same initial values given in equation(3.7). Equation(3.10) generalize the λth
order negative multinacci sequences.
Lemma 3.1. Let p is prime and K is generalized Fibonacci matrix, then
det(K) (mod p) = det(K (mod p)) (3.12)
Theorem 3.2 (Existence of Inverse of multinacci matrix). Let λ ∈ Z+, then for every
integer k ∈ Z, the inverse of multinacci matrices Qkλ is given by Q−kλ as defined in
equation(3.8).
Proof. We shall prove existence by mathematical induction on k. Since, by the definition
of Qkλ(3.8), we have
Q−1λ =


0 1 0 ... 0 0
0 0 1 ... 0 0
0 0 0 ... 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 ... 0 1
1 −1 −1 ... −1 −1


λ×λ
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and
Q−kλ =


f−k+λ−1 f−k+λ−2 + f−k+λ−3 + ... + f−k−1 ... f−k+λ−2
f−k+λ−2 f−k+λ−3 + f−k+λ−4 + ... + f−k−2 ... f−k+λ−3
...
...
. . .
...
f−k+1 f−k + f−k−1 + ...+ f−k−λ−1 ... f−k
f−k f−k−1 + f−k−2 + ... + f−k−λ−2 ... f−k−1


(3.13)
Now, for k = 1
Q1λ.Q
−1
λ =


1 1 1 ... 1
1 0 0 ... 0
0 1 0 ... 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ... 1


.


0 1 0 ... 0
0 0 1 ... 0
0 0 0 ... 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 −1 −1 ... −1


=


1 0 0 ... 0
0 1 0 ... 0
0 0 1 ... 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ... 1


λ×λ
= Iλ (3.14)
Since, we have Q−1λ .Q
−k
λ =


0 1 0 ... 0
0 0 1 ... 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ... 1
1 −1 −1 ... −1


.


f−k+λ−1 f−k+λ−2 + f−k+λ−3 + ...+ f−k−1 ... f−k+λ−2
f−k+λ−2 f−k+λ−3 + f−k+λ−4 + ...+ f−k−2 ... f−k+λ−3
...
...
. . .
...
f−k+1 f−k + f−k−1 + ...+ f−k−λ−1 ... f−k
f−k f−k−1 + f−k−2 + ...+ f−k−λ−2 ... f−k−1


=


f−k+λ−2 f−k+λ−3 + f−k+λ−4 + ... + f−k−2 ... f−k+λ−3
f−k+λ−3 f−k+λ−4 + f−k+λ−5 + ... + f−k−3 ... f−k+λ−4
f−k+λ−4 f−k+λ−5 + f−k+λ−6 + ... + f−k−4 ... f−k+λ−5
...
...
. . .
...
f−k f−k−1 + f−k−2 + ... + f−k−λ−2 ... f−k−1
f−k−1 f−k−2 + f−k−3 + ... + f−k−λ−3 ... f−k−2


= Q
−(k+1)
λ
Now, assume that result holds for k = m, i.e
Qmλ .Q
−m
λ = Iλ (3.15)
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Thus, for k = m+ 1, we have,
Q
(m+1)
λ .Q
−(m+1)
λ = Q
m
λ .Q
1
λQ
−1
λ .Q
−m
λ
= Qmλ .Iλ.Q
−m
λ Using equation(3.14)
= Qmλ .Q
−m
λ Using equation(3.15)
= Iλ (3.16)
Hence, proved
4 Proposed Encryption Schemes
Calculation of nth Fibonacci term
Since, the nth Fibonacci number is defined as the sum of the (n−1)th and (n−2)th term.
So to calculate the nth Fibonacci number, for instance, we need to compute all the n− 1
values before it first - quite a task, even with a calculator!
There is explicit formula for recurrence relation of order two by using which we
can be directly calculate the nth term of sequence, which reduces the time and space
complexity O(n2) to O(1), where O represents Big O − notation. It is given using
solutions of following characteristic equation, corresponding to recurrence relation(3.1)
α2 − α− 1 = 0 (4.1)
and explicit formula for nth term of Fibonacci sequence is
Fn =
1√
5
[(
1 +
√
5
2
)n
−
(
1−√5
2
)n]
Calculation of nth term for tribonacci numbers
Keeping in mind the complexity for construction of key matrix for modified hill’s cipher,
we may establish a formula for direct calculation of nth term of tribonacci sequence using
the generalization of explicit formula for higher order. Similar to Fibonacci sequence,
the nth term of tribonacci sequence is given using solutions of following characteristic
equation of degree three
α3 − α2 − α− 1 = 0 (4.2)
On solving equation(4.2), we get roots α1, α2 and α3, which are
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α1 =
(19 + 3
√
33)
2
3 + (19 + 3
√
33)
1
3 + 4
(19 + 3
√
33)
1
3
,
α2 =
(19 + 3
√
33)
2
3 (−1 + i√3) + 2(19 + 3√33) 13 − 4(1 + i√3)
6(19 + 3
√
33)
1
3
, and
α3 =
(19 + 3
√
33)
2
3 (1− i√3)− 2(19 + 3√33) 13 + 4(1− i√3)
6(19 + 3
√
33)
1
3
.
And nth term of tribonacci is given by
Fn = C1(α1)
n + C2(α2)
n + C3(α3)
n, n ∈ Z (4.3)
where,
C1 =
1
2
(
3
√
19+3
√
3
√
11+2
)
(19+3
√
3
√
11)
√
33(19+3
√
33)
2
3+2
√
11
3
√
19+3
√
33
√
3+23
√
33+9 (19+3
√
33)
2
3 +18
3
√
19+3
√
33+135
C2 =
−i/12
(
−9 i
√
11+4 i
3
√
19+3
√
33
√
3−9
√
33−19 i
√
3−12 3
√
19+3
√
33−57
)√
3
3
√
19+3
√
33
99+19
√
3
√
11
C3 =
−i/12
√
3
3
√
19+3
√
33
(
−9 i
√
11+4 i
3
√
19+3
√
33
√
3+9
√
33−19 i
√
3+12
3
√
19+3
√
33+57
)
99+19
√
33
Remark 2. For higher order Fibonacci sequence, we can construct corresponding dif-
ference equation but solution of higher order difference equation(greater than 3) is still
complicated.
4.1 Key Exchange Scheme
Suppose we have public key pk(p, E1, E2), where component of public key E1 and E2 is
created by Bob(receiver) with the help of their private keyD. Now, using this public key,
the secret key λ will be calculated(See, 2.1). After generating secret key λ, key matrixK
will be given as
4.1.1 Algorithm
Encryption Algorithm:
1. Alice chooses secret number e, such that 1 < e < φ(p)
2. Signature: k ← Ee1 (mod p)
3. Secret key: λ← Ee2 (mod p)
4. Key Matrix: K ← Qkλ, where Qkλ is multinacci matrix of order λ× λ (See, 3.8).
5. Encryption: Enc(P ) : Ci ← (PiK +B) (mod p)
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6. transmit (k, C) to Bob
Decryption Algorithm: Bob, after receiving (k, C)
1. Secret key: λ← kD (mod p)(see, 2.6), where D is Bob’s secret key.
2. Key Matrix: K ← Qkλ.
3. Decryption: Dec(C) : Pi ← (Ci − B)K−1 (mod p)
4.2 Numerical Example
Suppose Alice want to send message to Bob, then first she calculate key matrix K using
above proposed technique and then encrypt plaintext P with key matrix K.
Example 1 (Public key calculation). Assume that p = 37 and Bob’s private key is D =
13. Further Bob choose primitive root of p, say α = 5.
Bob assign E1 = α = 5 and compute E2 = E
D
1 (mod p) = 5
13 (mod 37) = 13
Thus, Bob’s public key pk(p, E1, E2) is pk(37, 5, 13) and secret key isD = 13.
Example 2 (Encryption-Decryption). Suppose plaintext be HELLO2019, public key is
pk(37, 5, 13) and shifting vector B is [31,13,19].
Solution. Here plaintext P = HELLO2019. So for encryption
First, choose e such that 1 < e < φ(p), let e = 22.
Calculating signature, k = Ee1 = 5
22 (mod 37) ≡ 4.
and secret key λ = Ee2 = 13
22 (mod 37) ≡ 3.
Now, constructing the key matrix K using above data according to generalized Fibonacci
matrix Qλ(3.8), which is given by
K = Qkλ = Q
4
3 =


f6 f5 + f4 f5
f5 f4 + f3 f4
f4 f3 + f2 f3

 =


7 6 4
4 3 2
2 2 1

 and K (mod 37) =


7 6 4
4 3 2
2 2 1


where generalized Fibonacci sequence for λ = 3(Tribonacci) is given as
Index ... -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ...
Tribonacci Seq. ... -8 4 1 -3 2 0 -1 1 0 0 1 1 2 4 7 13 24 ...
Now, consider the plaintext P = HELLO2019. The plain text is divided into blocks as
follows:
P1 = [H E L] = [07 04 11], P2 = [L O 2] = [11 14 28] and P3 = [0 1 9] = [26 27 35].
Encryption: C ← (PK +B) (mod 37).
11
C1 = (P1K +B) ≡

[07 04 11]


7 6 4
4 3 2
2 2 1

+ [31 13 19]

 (mod 37)
≡ (07 15 29) ∼ (H P 3)
C2 = (P2K +B) ≡

[11 14 28]


7 6 4
4 3 2
2 2 1

+ [31 13 19]

 (mod 37)
≡ (35 29 08) ∼ (9 3 I)
C3 = (P3K +B) ≡

[26 27 35]


7 6 4
4 3 2
2 2 1

+ [31 13 19]

 (mod 37)
≡ (21 24 27) ∼ (V Y 1)
which gives cipher-text C = (C1C2C3) = (HP393IV Y 1)
i.e P : HELLO2019→ C : HP393IV Y 1
Now, Alice send this cipher-text to Bob along with her signature.
Decryption: After receiving ciphertextC along with signature (k, B), Bob will calculate
decryption keyK∗ with the help of their secret keyD, which is given as
λ = kD (mod 37) = 413 (mod 37) ≡ 3
thus
K∗ = Q−kλ = Q
−4
3 =


f−2 f−3 + f−4 f−3
f−3 f−4 + f−5 f−4
f−4 f−5 + f−6 f−5

 =


−1 2 0
0 −1 2
2 −2 −3

,
And,K∗ (mod 37) =


36 2 0
0 36 2
2 35 34


Clearly, K.K∗ = I (mod 37)
Hence, decryption takes place as Pi ← (Ci − B).K∗ (mod 37).
P1 = (C1 −B)K∗ ≡
([
07 15 29
]
−
[
31 13 19
])
36 2 0
0 36 2
2 35 34

 (mod 37)
≡ (07 04 11) ∼ (H E L)
P2 = (C2 −B)K∗ ≡
([
31 25 06
]
−
[
31 13 19
])
36 2 0
0 36 2
2 35 34

 (mod 37)
≡ (11 14 28) ∼ (L O 2)
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P3 = (C3 −B)K∗ ≡
([
21 24 27
]
−
[
31 13 19
])
36 2 0
0 36 2
2 35 34

 (mod 37)
≡ (26 27 35) ∼ (0 1 9)
Thus, Bob recovered the plaintext HELLO2019 sent by Alice successfully.
5 Complexity analysis and strength
5.1 Security Strength and Analysis
Definition 5.1 (Brute force attack:). A brute force attack is a technique of breaking a
cryptographic scheme by trying a large number of possibilities(i.e all possible combina-
tion). In most of cases, a brute force attack typically means, testing all possible keys in
order to recover the information(plaintext) used to produce a particular ciphertext.
One way for an adversary(say Oscar) to break our proposed technique using brute
force attack, is to generate all possible matrices. Since, we are working on Fp(p > 26 be
a prime), so Oscar need to check pλ
2
matrices.
Example 3. Let p = 37 and λ = 50, then Oscar need to check pλ
2
= 3750
2
= 372500
matrices, which is equivalent to 3.1938180242× 103920 and too large.
As we know that GLλ denotes the General Linear group [1, 4], which consists of all
invertible matrices of order λ× λ over Fp and its order is given by
|GLλ(Fp)| = (pλ − pλ−1)(pλ − pλ−2) · · · (pλ − p1)(pλ − 1) (5.1)
Example 4. Consider key matrixK = Q1950 over F37. Here, we have λ = 50 and p = 37
So, total number of invertible matrices of order 50× 50 over F37 is,
|GL50(F37)| = (3750 − 3749)(3750 − 3748) · · · (3750 − 37)(3750 − 1) (5.2)
= 3.105165707300569× 103920
Thus in this case, for Oscar to recover this key matrix need to check 103920 possible matri-
ces, which is almost difficult. Following list shows the strength of system with proposed
key matrix Qkλ over F37.
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λ k Possible no. of matrix to check over Fp=37 by Oscar
|GLλ(Fp)| = (pλ − pλ−1)(pλ − pλ−2) · · · (pλ − 1)
1 1 Q11 → |GL2(F37)| = 36
2 Q21 → |GL2(F37)| = 36
...
...
k Qk1 → |GL2(F37)| = 36
2 1 Q12 → |GL2(F37)| = 1.82218× 106
2 Q22 → |GL2(F37)| = 1.82218× 106
...
...
k Qk2 → |GL2(F37)| = 1.82218× 106
3 1 Q13 → |GL3(F37)| = 1.26354× 1014
2 Q23 → |GL3(F37)| = 1.26354× 1014
...
...
k Qk3 → |GL3(F37)| = 1.26354× 1014
4 1 Q14 → |GL4(F37)| = 1.19951× 1025
2 Q24 → |GL4(F37)| = 1.19951× 1025
...
...
k Qk4 → |GL4(F37)| = 1.19951× 1025
...
...
...
λ k Qkλ → |GLλ(F37)| = (37λ − 37λ−1) · · · (37λ − 1)
From above table, it is clear that by making prime p too large, it is almost unbreakable.
Also, we observed that it does not depends on k and if we increase the size of key matrix
for fixed p, then |GLλ(Fp)| → ∞. Thus, if the key space is large, then breaking of system
by Brute-force attack [12] is impractical. In that case, the opponent may try analysis of
ciphertext by various statistical test on it.
5.2 Complexity Analysis
A encryption scheme’s strength is determined by the computational power needed to
break it. The computational complexity of an algorithm is measured by two factors; time
complexity(T) and space complexity(S). Both T and S are commonly expressed as func-
tions of n, where n is the size of the input. The time complexity [14] of an algorithm
describes the amount of time it takes to run. In general, the computational complexity of
an algorithm is expressed by big O notation.
O-notation : For a given function g(n),O(g(n)) represents the set of functions,O(g(n)) =
{f(n) : ∃ positive constants a and n0 such that 0 ≤ f(n) ≤ a.g(n) for all n, n ≥ n0}
It is well known that for matrix multiplication, complexity in worst case is O(n3),
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which increases the time complexity of matrix multiplications of large sizes. But, here in
case of generalized Fibonacci matrices this time complexity reduces to O(n) (See,3.8).
5.3 Conclusion
As we know that in a Ring, all non-zero elements does not have necessarily multiplicative
inverse. So for encryption key matrix, we use to take entries from field.
But here, in case of multinacci matrices, we do not need to worry about field, it works
fine with ring Zn, n ∈ N. Because as we proved above, in case of multinacci matrices
Qkλ, we have always a matrix Q
−k
λ such that Q
k
λQ
−k
λ = I . Thus multinacci matrices as
key matrix for encryption system, play a important role, which increases the key space
and complexity of breaking.
In this paper, we have worked on generalization of Fibonacci matrices(corresponding
to Fibonacci sequences) and their inverse with direct calculation of nth multinacci term.
Also developed a public key cryptography using Affine-Hill cipher with extended Fi-
bonacci(multinacci matrix) matrix Qkλ under prime modulo, where Q
k
λ is matrix of order
λ× λ and its elements are constructed using terms of multinacci sequences.
Our proposed method strengthen the security of the system which has three digital
signatures namely λ, k and B. Since,K(Corresponding to k,K = Qkλ) and B are known
only to Alice and Bob, So it is not possible to break this system by anyone. Our proposed
method is mathematically simple and having large key space, as for construction of key
for known party is easy but for intruder it is very difficult to construct a matrix with the
help of tuple (λ, k). This is the main beauty of our proposed schemes for key establish-
ment. This proposed system take care of authenticity and integrity of data as key k and λ
is known only to Bob and Alice.
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